In the early months of 2012, cyber attacks against Israel increased, and the Twitter accounts eager for Anonymous to launch an official operation against them the year prior, nearly all of which used the hashtag #OpIsrael, finally got their wish.
On January 11, 2012, Mostafa Ahmadi Roshan, an Iranian scientist who reportedly headed up the country’s military nuclear program, was killed by a magnetic bomb that had been placed on his car. Israel immediately became the prime suspect in the assassination. And although there were varying degrees of attention focused on Israel towards the end of 2011, the assassination of yet another Iranian scientist sparked a war on the cyber front.
Two days prior, on January 9th, someone tweeted about #OpIsrael and if you remember from the previous article, this was the first time the hashtag was used since November 7, 2011, again, taking into consideration that it’s highly probable some tweets and accounts are no longer available from this time period.
I realize that I keep hammering on this last point but it’s important and if you don’t know why, go find CIA-funded Professor Laura Dilley and her research assistant, fed-collaborator and Sabu bestie, William Welna, who thought they could dive into Qanon research three years late to the party and determine influential Twitter users behind the movement—after Twitter purged most of them.
On the day of Roshan’s murder, International Business Times reported, “Following the car explosion in Iran that killed a nuclear scientist in Tehran, prominent Anon Sabu has threatened Israel on his Twitter account.” More:
The hacker [Sabu] called on other Anon members across the globe to attack Israeli government websites and infrastructures in response of the blast that murdered Mostafa Ahmadi-Roshan, an academic who also worked at the Natanz uranium enrichment facility.
“Hackers across the globe: The Israeli government abuses the sovereignty of Iran and has waged war on its scholars .gov.il ownage starts..NOW,” [Sabu] tweeted…
“Since #israel started the week by blowing up Iranian nuclear scientists – how about we focus on disrupting their infrastructure?” tweeted Sabu.
In another message, he urged all Israelis “who are against the bombings in Iran” to join Anonymous’ efforts against the government. “Calling on all Israeli’s who are against the bombings in Iran. Join us in spreading the word to your government that this is not accepted,” he tweeted.
“Are we really going to allow #Israel to continue to murder people without consequences? F**k that. DEFCON 2 commence,” reads another tweet.
Sabu, who had turned informant 6 months prior and whose computer was being monitored by the FBI 24/7 (and he knew this), declared #FuckIsrael Day the following day and encouraged everyone to take part in it.
That very same day, a Saudi-based hacker named “0xOmar” also invited the hackers of the world to unite against Israel. This came after a Saudi hacking group called Group-XP “claimed that it had obtained personal information of about 400,000 Israelis, and files containing the information were posted online by 0xOmar.” In fact, Sabu was clearly following 0xOmar’s activities:
Rounding out a busy day, the term “Mauritania Hacker Team” was also mentioned on Twitter (based on EST) for the first time since its initial debut on July 5, 2011, a month after Sabu became an informant.
From #OpISIS Part 3:
“Mauritania Attacker,” an Islamic hacker from Africa, claims that he was a member of Team Poison before joining the Z Company Hacking Crew. After leaving ZHC, he went on to start a new hacking group called “Mauritania Hacker Team.”
According to an article published by Reuters in 2013, Mauritania Attacker, the leader and founder of the pro-Islamic group, Mauritania Hacking Group, represented “a new generation of Western-style Islamists who promote religious conversation and traditional value, and oppose those they see as backing Zionism and Western hegemony…Mauritian Attacker and his team members were not extremists and were fighting for Islam “using peaceful means…”
In 2012, the group appeared out of nowhere but they quickly made a name for themselves by (allegedly) committing high-profile cyber attacks which included hacking the Bank of Israel’s website and leaking “tons of credit card details.”
After creating the Mauritania Hacking Team, the Mauritania Attacker went on to form another hacking group called “Teamr00t…After Teamr00t disbanded, Mauritania Attacker put together a crew called “Anonghost,” another pro-Palestinian, anti-Israel hacking group that included former members of Teamr00t.
Also reported was the fact that in a different interview with meethackers.in, Mauritania Attacker bizarrely discussed how he onboarded U.S. and U.K. intelligence agents to the Anonghost team because this sounds completely normal and not at all like someone trying to cover their arse later in case they get caught having feds on their team:
On January 12, 2012, an online user with the handle “dangeroushowers” also posted a video to Youtube and attributed it to the Mauritania Hacker Team. In the video description, dangeroushowers wrote, “Follow me https://www.facebook.com/MauritaniaSec,” but the account is no longer available. Google also doesn’t return anything for “MauritaniaSec,” nor does Twitter.
Another video that dangeroushowers posted linked to a different Facebook page called “face.Mauritanie,” but that account doesn’t exist anymore, either.
Furthermore, I have no idea when the “dangeroushowers” Youtube account added the facebook link in the description above, meaning that it’s unknown if the account was originally called “MauritaniaSec,” or if the name was added later and, if so, when?
However, what’s interesting is that none other than Ouali Bouziad commented on a December 26, 2012 video that dangeroushowers posted entitled, “Bangladesh Network HaCked by Mauritania Attacker”:
It has long been reported that Bouziad was one of the co-founders of AnonGhost—the hacking team spawned from Mauritanian Hacker Team/Teamr00t—so this may be a good indication that whoever was behind the name “dangeroushowers” was a member of the team.
In 2016, Ghost Squad Hackers doxed Bouziad as the co-founder of the United Cyber Caliphate (UCC), a pro-ISIS hacking collective formed from Ghost Caliphate Section, Sons Caliphate Army, Caliphate Cyber Army and Kalachikov E-security team.
Ghost Squad Hackers also claimed that Mauritania Attacker (founder of Mauritania Hacker Team, Teamr00t, and Anonghost) was the leader of UCC, a report that may or may not be true when we consider the fact that false doxing can do wonders for actors trying to distance themselves from certain activities. It also opens up an entirely new can of worms which I’ll address at a later date.
When it came to the popularity of dangeroushowers’ videos, what’s left on the internet shows that very few people shared or retweeted them. As previously mentioned, on January 12th, @anonLibertarian shared one of their videos on Twitter and on January 16th, a Facebook user (“Dixit Gargi” aka “UnpretentiousDiva”) posted a video from dangeroushowers, stating, “Do not keep anything private on Facebook or in hotmail.”
And on January 18th, @PBoxStBrieuc tweeted the link to the “HaCk Everything with Smtp” video (3 screenshots up):
Archive
As for the user name “dangeroushowers,” there’s very little information available aside from a blog site managed by a U.K. high school language teacher. In 2009, the teacher posted a music video from dangeroushowers’ now-defunct Daily Motion account under the category “Le Maroc,” or Morocco. I’m not saying the two are related e.g. associates. I’m saying this was all I could find.
The Remainder of January 2012
Throughout the remainder of January 2012, hacktivism and tit-for-tat cyber wars against Israeli and Saudi websites continued. On January 13th, israelnationalnews.com reported that the “Israeli Defense Ministry is to establish a special cyber warfare administration,” but not before 0xOmar took down the websites of both the Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange and Israeli Airline, El Al, the very next day. In retaliation, Israel’s IDF team took down the websites of both the Saudi and UAE stock exchange.
Meanwhile, Arab hackers called for “cyber jihad” and according to Reuters, Hamas “welcomed the [cyber] attacks as a blow against the Jewish state.” Hamas spokesman Sami Abu Zuhri:
This is a new field of resistance against the occupation and we urge Arab youth to develop their methods in electronic warfare in the face of [Israel’s] crimes.
As these cyber wars heated up, on January 28th, the @op_israel Twitter account was created and it became one of the most active accounts throughout the coming #OpIsrael days.
February 2012
On February 9th, Anonymous released a video entitled, “A Message To The State of Israel,” and despite “#OpIsrael” missing from the actual announcement, Twitter users revived the hashtag in tandem with the video.
Anonymous confronted Israel in the video, “Your Zionist bigotry has displaced and killed a great many. As the world weeps you laugh while planning your next attack,” and “You label all who refuse to comply with your superstitious demands as anti- Semitic and have taken steps to ensure a nuclear holocaust.”
They also vowed to “systematically” remove Israel from the internet and as the The Jerusalum Post put it, “The release of the clip came amid an internet feud between Israeli and Arab hackers, which began in early January when a Saudi hacker [0xOmar] published tens of thousands of Israeli credit card numbers on the internet.”
The video was published by “TheAnonPress88,” and one Twitter account asked, “Speaking of targeting Israel, what is #OpIsrael & why an 88 on the uploader’s FB name?”
In case you missed it, the number 88 is used as an abbreviation for “Heil Hitler,” so regardless of whether or not that was the message TheAnonPress88 was trying to convey, it certainly gave the operation overt, anti-Semitic overtones.
TheAnonPress (aka TheAnonPress88, @AmenityParadox) created their Youtube account on April 4, 2011, approximately two months after Anonymous decimated HBGary Federal’s then-CEO, Aaron Barr, and two months before Sabu was initially arrested. According to one blogger, TheAnonPress was involved with a 2011 Anonymous campaign called “The Plan: One Year. Three Phases. A World a Change,” which you can find on the archived website whatis-theplan.org.
According to icann.org, the website was created on June 16, 2011, now just nine days after Sabu turned informant and amidst a number of other things happening, including former activist, Jennifer Emick, passing along her FBI handler’s phone number to online troll, William Welna, who, ironically (and interestingly enough), went on to snitch-jacket Barrett Brown a year later.
On June 25th, “The Plan” opened a Youtube account and by July 8th, they were on Twitter. The website alone is questionable based on the fact it has a page that not only includes a list of their registered members, it actually lists users’ birthdays and “users with a birthday within the next 7 days.” Welcome to Anonymous, I guess. They also penned an open letter to #AntiSec, praising Sabu’s fed-infested, compromised group:
When people look for a hero nowadays, they look to Anonymous and #AntiSec…
We are fully aware of your concerns and criticisms about The Plan, that some of us may decry your actions as hurtful to the image of Anonymous. However, these voices are in the minority, and do not represent the view point of The Plan as a whole.
And after registering on the website because that’s what the administrators inexplicably forced everyone to do, one forum user wrote:
The third phase of the evolution of Anonymous, which I will call the AntiSec Anonymous began in earnest with the Wikileaks US State Department cable leak, which resulted in attacks by world governments and credit card companies against Wikileaks founder Julian Assange.
With this apparent attempt at censorship, the Streisand Effect sprang into motion once again, and we witnessed the Operation Payback of AnonyOps, a coordinated Denial of Service campaign against the major credit card companies, as well as a coordinated effort to distribute and digest the leaked State Department cables.
During this phase, of note, we have also witnessed the rise of LulzSec, their astonishing string of hacks against symbols of government and corporate corruption, and the leaks of some very damning information. Thanks to the actions of AnonyOps and LulzSec, we can now proudly inherit the evolved idea of Anonymous in the form of AntiSec, and everything that it stands for.
Right. So maybe whoever was behind “The Plan” was completely snowed by Sabu like virtually everyone else but that doesn’t explain forcing activists to register on their website, publicly listing their birthdays, or “Operation Onslaught,” a fed operation if I ever saw one. Below is taken from their July 20th video “Onslaught”:
July 30th, 2011
Spread the word. Tell the world that we are here and we are Anonymous. Announce our stand by posting flyers, stickers, tags, etc across your cities. Anyone participating in online ops will be hitting Twitter, Facebook, Youtube, and Myspace [Myspace??].
Street Operatives
*Print flyers from the gallery or make your own.
*Get stickers from the store or make your own.
*Ready your stencils and paints.
Street Operatives:
At nightfall, hit major centers across your city and spread the message that freedom is alive in all of us and Anonymous is here to make sure the people are heard…
Street Operatives:
We recommend getting a group together in your respective area, prepare your materials and hit the streets at nightfall on July 30th. Comm systems help with keeping track of progress with members of your local team.
Street Operatives:
Keep track of flyers and stickers posted and have a total tally ready. Post your total amount in this thread once you return to “home base”.
Online Operatives:
Report to #operations in IRC at 8:45PM Eastern Standard Time.
There you will report to moderators who will be assigning team.
Each team will have a designated target and a message to spread.
Teams will post a specified link/message to targets and keep tally of how many posts made. Members posting to Facebook can upload flyers to their photos and tag celebrities as well…
Upon completion, each member will report their posts to a coordinator who will keep a tally on total posts.
Through this coordinated effort..we will reach a massive number of people.
Hooboy. So, I’ve never been a part of Anonymous and I wouldn’t know how to access an IRC channel if my life depended on it, but common sense tells me that this is not standard operating procedure.
“Comms systems” so you can track your fellow team members who are armed with…stickers? Stick to the script, post only what they want you to post, keep track of what you post, how many times that you post, and then hand over that information directly to “The Plan?” And just in case “The Plan” can’t keep track of you, upload a picture of the flyer you’re distributing to your Facebook page?
Who were the moderators handing out targets and assigning teams? Who were the coordinators tracking everything these activists did? There’s no mention of hacking or cyber disruptions, and it contains periods outside of quotation marks so whoever wrote this may very well not be American e.g. British or Australian. As for what the actual “plan” was, here you go:
If this looks complicated or you’re too lazy to take part in the action, don’t worry, you can buy a T-shirt instead because, good news, Anonymous monetized the campaign.
In case you forgot how we got here, TheAnonPress88 posted a video on February 9, 2012, announcing an operation against Israel, you know, about “systematically” removing them from the internet. Eight months prior, they were part of and/or promoted “The Plan,” some sort of monetized campaign that heavily endorsed Sabu’s fed-infested #AntiSec.
Two days after TheAnonPress88 posted the [#OpIsrael] video, the first “Anonghost” Twitter account was created but as I noted in Part 3, it appears that they were mainly focused on Latin America:
@AnonGh0st: Created on February 11, 2012, the account is still alive and appeared to focus on Latin American operations, namely Brazil. That’s not to say you can’t find tweets mentioning “@anongh0st” outside the scope of Latin America, you can, they just didn’t appear that involved with #OpIsrael.
However, Teamr00t was involved with some hacks in Latin America so maybe that was the account’s original purpose. It was also created during the same time period when Sabu and the FBI were feeding Jeremy Hammond targets in Brazil so whatever. Maybe that’s something to keep in mind.
At this point in the timeline (the end of February 2012), Anonymous had destroyed HBGary Federal’s then-CEO, Aaron Barr, and dropped HBGary’s emails online a year prior; #LulzSec had humiliated the CIA and InfraGard; #AntiSec hacked Stratfor (with FBI approval and oversight) and WikiLeaks started publishing those files in late February 2012—after previously publishing the Guantanamo Files, the Afghan and Iraq War logs, and U.S. State Department cables. And now we have an informant (Sabu) and a hacking cowboy from Saudi Arabia encouraging the entire hackisphere to destroy Israel’s infrastructure.
So I ask you, “What would you do if you were the U.S. government, CIA, FBI, Israeli intelligence, or a private intelligence firm tied to these agencies and/or had been targeted by Anonymous?” Would you start an #OpIsrael campaign that eventually morphed into #OpISIS as a means to further infiltrate the collective and other activist communities? Maybe. Would it really surprise you if they did?
On February 16, 2012, seven days after AnonPress88 published the [#OpIsrael] video, Jaime Chanaga filed corporate documents for Umbra Systems, LLC, the same company that later filed for the trademark “Exeintel.” Exeintel is mentioned in previous #OpISIS articles because of its ties to FBI agent, Jason Chambers, and far-right, “Nazi porn” troll, @SheliJ, who was allegedly funneled case information that originated with Agent Chambers in order to bolster his private security firm’s profile.
One “Anonymous” account in particular that planted themselves inside the WikiLeaks support community right before the Vault 7 release while working with fed collaborator, @SheliJ, and telling activists to follow Tracy Beanz because WikiLeaks was “compiling” her videos (insert face punch for people like myself who actually listened to this account for years), is @AnonScandinavia.
The account is a close associate of Beth Bogaerts (@HumanOfMind), who fraudulently obtained the Cicada 3301 trademark back in 2019. Both of these individuals/accounts operate within what one might describe as a small echo chamber and disinfo/disruption group that includes Bogaerts, Jesselyn Radack, @ATafoyovosky (“Lestat”), and Ray Johansen.
Additionally, and if the content is legit, a private DM that has been circulating shows that Johansen was working directly with Canadian hacker, Aubrey Cottle (a.k.a. Kirtaner), running disinformation campaigns under the guise of debunking Qanon, which I firmly believe was initiated to generate false evidence that could be used to sway two U.S. court cases that Bogaerts was involved in (she’s currently still being sued).
This would likely include Cottle speaking with Jim Stewartson (based on Stewartson’s leaked messages), a LARP debunking moron or whatnot who was fed an ungodly amount of disinformation from Johansen’s associates like @ATafoyovsky. This included disinformation both about me and about Trevor Fitzgibbon, who is currently suing Bogaerts. Hence, it should come as no surprise that @ATafoyovsky’s source for disinformation and manipulation was none other than Bogaerts (a.k.a. Fox, @HumanOfMind), the very same person who initially tried to sue Fitzgibbon, but much to her chagrin, he filed a counterclaim. That case is still open.
Cottle openly admits that he works with both U.S. and Canadian authorities so it should also come as no surprise that he’s assisted the feds and other law enforcement agencies in circumventing burdensome warrants by allegedly hacking and leaking massive data dumps about private citizens to DDoSecrets (Distributed Denial of Secrets).
In fact, Johansen claims that he flew to Massachusetts to help DDoSecrets set up shop but don’t worry, I’m sure he lied and has since changed his tune by sliding into everyone’s DMs crying, “Help help, Llama is making up more stuff, I’m a victim!” Ah, but Signal messages don’t lie. And like Johansen, Cottle uses his real name, doesn’t take any steps to hide his location, and brags about hacks but is somehow never arrested.
No one has been willing to discuss or report on any of the information in the last seven paragraphs aside from SheliJ and Exeintel ‘s alleged involvement with Agent Chambers and Andy Ngo, as well as Cottle in terms of infiltrating Barrett Brown’s circles, and his relationship with federal agencies and DDoSecrets’ activities. Naturally, this has led me to believe that there is yet another exhausting disinformation/coverup operation in motion.
As for the Exeintel story, what is apparently safe to talk about is Buzzfeed‘s reporting that Agent Chambers was sniffing around the ISIS slaying/#OpISIS community as early as 2015. As of now, I think it’s possible that the 2012 filing of Umbra Systems indicates that the government was already preparing to infiltrate more Anonymous campaigns at the time (or create their own), especially if they knew that their operative, Sabu, would be taken out of circulation the following month. From #OpISIS Part 3:
I realize there’s a hefty amount of animosity between Anonymous and an American hacker named “Jester,” but in 2012, Jester made a good point about the leaderless collective that prides itself on anonymity (but not really because they’ll dox literally anyone and their mother if you hurt their manbaby feelings). Because of this so-called strong belief in anonymity and the shared idea that anyone can be “Anonymous,” any individual or group can hack, leak, and protest in their name.
Not only does this include terrorist groups like ISIS, it obviously includes intelligence agents masquerading as members of Anonymous. On no level, in any universe, is this rocket science. Jester noted that ISIS appeared to be doing exactly that so why not the feds? In fact, the CIA didn’t even have to disguise themselves during #OpISIS to get members of Anonymous to work with them so I mean…
In the previous article, I also wrote, “[O]ne has to wonder how the U.S. government and these private intelligence firms exacted their revenge,” and what many people may not realize is that Jaime Chanaga, CEO of Umbra Systems, is also a volunteer for Infragard, a private security firm that works hand in hand with the FBI. It’s been alleged that Neal Rauhauser also worked for Infragard:
The importance of this goes straight to the heart of revenge and fed infiltration: #LulzSec and Anonymous hacked Infragard numerous times. Couple that with what they did to the CIA, HBGary Federal, Aaron Barr, Stratfor, etc, and it would be silly to think that the U.S. government, as well as these private intelligence firms, didn’t put operations in place to further exact revenge and tackle the Anonymous/WikiLeaks problem.
I’m not saying that happened. I’m saying it’s naive to think that it couldn’t happen. Take, for instance, what happened with former Chanology activist, Jennifer Emick, who became hellbent on taking Anonymous down. Not only did she social engineer hacktivists to gather information and identities, she eventually teamed up with Aaron Barr and shared her research with the FBI.
Or a simple search of icwatch.wikileaks.org shows that Accenture’s current deputy director for product strategy and business development, Paul Lukoskie, was involved with ad-hock products from the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center, a cybersecurity division within Homeland Security, as early as June 2012. These products were directed towards the Syrian Electronic Army and Anonymous operations such as #OpUSA, #OpIsrael, and #OpPetrol, all three of which Anonghost initiated and/or was heavily involved in.
Side note: Accenture partners with companies such as Endgame Systems and Team8, “an Israeli ‘cybersecurity think tank and company creation platform’ run by former members of Israel’s Defense Force intelligence unit, 8200.”
And then there’s Jonathan Nichols, a “DoD Secret Cleared Communications and Intelligence Strategist” and former security analyst for Flashpoint Partners, who listed this on his LinkedIn profile:
- The creation of new tools that track and trend hackers, hacktivists, and jihadists by leveraging vulnerabilities in their electronic communications and their human interactions
- the development of novel methods to leverage Social Media in intelligence operations
- recruitment of high profile hackers into HUMINT networks at major conferences
- tracking the distribution of personally identifiable information of political leadership as it was disseminated through criminal hacker networks.
And as early as November 2013, two years before FBI Agent Chambers was supposedly sniffing around #OpISIS, Nichols was:
- Developing HUMINT networks within hacker culture through face to face and online engagements
- Leading the industry in reporting on the nexus between hackers, hacktivists, and state actors, including the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Cyber Fighters, the Syrian Electronic Army, Anonymous, AnonGhost
This guy is literally saying that they infiltrated “hacker culture,” social engineered networks or those within them, and recruited “high profile hackers.” And that’s just one guy from one private intelligence firm so imagine how many others there were, especially when it was in their personal and/or corporate financial interest to get involved.
The real question is who did they recruit among the hacktivist/activist and/or transparency/truth movement back in 2012-2013? Ya’ll didn’t actually think that they arrested #LulzSec, the PayPal 14, and Barrett Brown, and then just washed their hands of the hacktivist scene without obtaining a single informant aside from Sabu, did you?
Three days after Chanaga filed Umbra Systems, LLC, newcomer Mauritania Hacker Team—who had only been mentioned on Twitter twice at this point— made their big debut by allegedly hacking 15,000 Israeli emails. On February 27, 2012, they also targeted the Bank of Israel (allegedly), solidifying their reputation as a hacking group to be reckoned with.
Post Disclaimer
Disclaimer: Ten thousand more pages of disclaimers to follow.
If you were mentioned in this article because your associate(s) did or said something stupid/dishonest, that’s not a suggestion that you did or said something stupid/dishonest or that you took part in it. Of course, some may conclude on their own that you associate with stupid/dishonest individuals but that’s called having the right to an opinion. If I’ve questioned something that doesn’t make sense to me, that’s not me spinning the confusing material you’ve put out. That’s me trying to make sense out of something that doesn’t make sense. And if I’ve noted that you failed to back up your allegations that means I either missed where you posted it or you failed to back your shiz up.
If I haven’t specifically stated that I believe (my opinion) someone is associated with someone else or an event, then it means just that. I haven’t reported an association nor is there any inference of association on my part. For example, just because someone is mentioned in this article, it doesn’t mean that they’re involved or associated with everyone and everything else mentioned. If I believe that there’s an association between people and/or events, I’ll specifically report it.
If anyone mentioned in this article wants to claim that I have associated them with someone else or an event because I didn’t disclose every single person and event in the world that they are NOT associated with, that’s called gaslighting an audience and it’s absurd hogwash i.e. “They mentioned that I liked bananas but they didn’t disclose that I don’t like apples. Why are they trying to associate me with apples???” Or something similar to this lovely gem, “I did NOT give Trish the thumb drive!” in order to make their lazy audience believe that it was reported they gave Trish the thumb drive when, in fact, that was never reported, let alone inferred.
That’s some of the BS I’m talking about so try not to act like a psychiatric patient, intelligence agent, or paid cyber mercenary by doing these things. If you would like to share your story, viewpoint, or any evidence that pertains to this article, or feel strongly that something needs to be clarified or corrected (again, that actually pertains to the article), you can reach me at jimmysllama@protonmail.com with any questions or concerns.
I cannot confirm and am not confirming the legitimacy of any messages or emails in this article. Please see a doctor if sensitivity continues. If anyone asks, feel free to tell them that I work for Schoenberger, Fitzgibbon, Steven Biss, the CIA, or really just about any intelligence agency because your idiocy, ongoing defamation, and failure as a human is truly a sight to behold for the rest of us.
If I described you as a fruit basket or even a mental patient it's because that is my opinion of you, it's not a diagnosis. I'm not a psychiatrist nor should anyone take my personal opinions as some sort of clinical assessment. Contact @BellaMagnani if you want a rundown on the psych profile she ran on you.
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